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Innovation Games: A New
and innovator support.
Rules for managing innovation are neither generic best practices that can be applied
predetermined sets of rules but leave ample room for creative competition and
collaboration.
uncertainty and risk. For them, innovating is like playing the tables at Las Vegas. Success requires
ARTICLE IN PRESSOur approach urges business executives and academics to reassess the validity of con-
ventional approaches, no matter how well established. Managers should worry far less
about imitating industry best practices, and more about correctly gauging strategic issues.
The first order of business for all players should be to turn potential negative-sum games
into positive-sum games.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Many managers and analysts see innovation as an unmanageable phenomenon, riddled with greatuniversally, nor narrow industry-specific recipes. Instead, distinct contexts call for specific
strategies and rules to create and capture market value. Thus, innovation games are notApproach to the Competitive
Challenge
Roger Miller, Xavier Olleros and Luis Molinie´
Innovation is often perceived as an unmanageable phenomenon. Bets are placed on new
products with the hope that a few winners will compensate for the many losers. At best,
sophisticated selection procedures impose a certain discipline and provide guidance for
containing costly errors. The research that we have conducted yields a more nuanced view.
Innovation, we have found, becomes manageable when managers move away from
universalistic prescriptions and recognise that different rules and practices apply in dif-
ferent contexts. Our main argument is that both executives and public officials need to
learn from the new realities of innovation. Instead of being a uniform process, innovation
takes place in seven distinct ‘games’, focusing on market creation, market maintenanceLong Range Planning -- (2008) ---e--- http://www.elsevier.com/locate/lrpmultiple bets, in the hope that a few winners will more than compensate for the many losers. At
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best, some rigorous selection methods attempt to impose various degrees of structure and discipline
on the screening process as a way to avoid costly errors.
A study that we have conducted in collaboration with the Industrial Research Institute yields
a more nuanced view. In spite of all the uncertainties, innovation becomes a manageable process
when managers stop relying on universal prescriptions and instead recognise that different sets
resources to invest in R&D, develop steering practices and build competencies to launch successful
For many managers, innovating is like playing the tables at Las Vegas
Widespread imitation of ‘best practices’ can be self-defeating, resulting
in entire sectors trapped in competition that leads to little growth
ARTICLE IN PRESS2 Innovation Gamesnew products.
This conventional model entails several assumptions, however. Products are fully developed be-
fore they are launched. Markets are exogenous spaces waiting to be filled with offerings that meet
pre-existing and discernible customer needs. Markets select products strictly on the basis of relative
merit and utility. The capture of value relies on strong intellectual property protection, often result-
ing in temporary monopolistic positions.
On the basis of the presumed validity of these assumptions, managers are encouraged to search
and adopt universal best practices. We will argue instead that widespread imitation of ‘best prac-
tices’ can be self-defeating, resulting in entire sectors being trapped in competition that leads to lit-
tle growth. Each game entails a distinct logic of innovation, calling for specific strategies and rules.
Recent studies are at odds with the assumptions underlying the conventional model, and highlight
significant new realities that will help us gain a better understanding of innovation. Below, we con-
sider some aspects of the conventional approach to innovation, and contrast them with these new
realities.of rules, capabilities, and practices apply in different contexts. Innovative success is never random:
it follows multiple logics and paths.
The ‘games of innovation’ perspective proposes that different patterns emerge and coexist as a re-
sult of contextual conditions and production technologies calling for distinct but persistent rules of
action. Our central thesis is that firms that achieve high levels of performance, not by adopting ‘best
practices’, but by adapting their strategies, capabilities and practices to the requirements of value
creation and value capture in the innovation game(s) in which they have chosen to compete.
The purpose of this paper is to present our empirical findings about games of innovation. The
first section outlines the limitations of universal models of innovation and sketches the new realities
of innovation processes. The second section proposes a parsimonious set of ‘games’ for a better un-
derstanding of innovation-based competition. In the third section, an empirical taxonomy of seven
different games illustrates the distinct dynamics of innovation. The persistence of games and the
migrations of sectors, industries and firms across games are described in the fourth section. To con-
clude, the key lessons of our approach for business academics and executives are presented.
Theoretical approaches to innovation: conventional and unconventional
The conventional approach to industrial innovation builds on Schumpeter’s view that entrepre-
neurial creative destruction has been replaced by the management of innovative activities in large
firms through internalised R&D processes.1 Given their market positions, incumbent firms have thePlease cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
Planning (2008), doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2008.02.006
From self-contained artifacts to systemic products
Products in the conventional approach are viewed as self-contained artifacts, while in reality they
are increasingly systemic and bundled with services: airplane building and banking networks, for
In the conventional model, products are fully developed and in many cases certified by public reg-
ulators before market launch. Customers select complete products. By contrast, in open systems the
first generations of systemic products tend to be incomplete prototypes, proposed with the inten-
tion of attracting the interest of innovative buyers and potential complementors. Early buyers trig-
ger demand, which induces complementors to develop the components that make further growth
of markets possible. Prototypes evolve: high levels of performance are reached several months or
years after initial product entry.
ARTICLE IN PRESSFrom pre-existing markets to market creation
In the conventional model, markets pre-exist. Market research can uncover customers’ needs and
estimate market sizes. Buyers make autonomous and well-informed adoption decisions: the com-
plexity of products is generally hidden. By contrast, with systemic products, markets do not pre-
exist: they emerge as customers progressively discover their needs by experiencing new systems
and prototypes. Markets become actualised in response to redesigns, buyers’ learning, and the
co-evolution of systems and their complements.4
From internal integration to ecosystems
In the conventional model, innovative activities are generally conducted in-house. By contrast,
when products are systemic, innovation is a collective effort in which networks of firms form eco-
systems of complementary and supporting organisations.5 With systemic products, effective inno-
vation involves outsourcing, collaborations and alliances with coordinators.
Networks of firms sharing parts of the innovation process usually trigger dynamics of interaction
that can differ substantially from rational planning. The interactions of specialised firms under the
sponsorship of an orchestrator may lead to generative and independent innovations that are far dif-
ferent from, and often superior to, initial designs.6
In open systems the first generations of systemic products tend to be
incomplete prototypes
Long Range Planning, vol -- 2008 3example, blend goods with services.2 Systemic products are built from complementary and speci-
alised modules coordinated by an integrating architecture to perform specific functions. Product
delivery involves many specialised firms e some producing components, others managing coordi-
nation and fostering integration.
From closed to open systems
When products are built as closed systems, integrators control the architecture and pre-specify its
evolution. A closed approach does not prevent some components from being developed by external
partners or outsourced, but this is done on a contractual basis according to specifications issued by
integrators.
By contrast, an open approach focuses on the management of a core platform while letting com-
plementors and third-party suppliers innovate independently. The core platform tends to be stable,
while innovation thrives at the periphery.3 Innovation is thus decentralised and relies on the inven-
tive resources of complementors. In this fashion, the level of energy can be much higher, and in-
dependent efforts can trigger multiple paths of innovation.
From rationally planned products to prototypingPlease cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
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From meritocratic selection to hyperselection
In the conventional model, products are selected strictly on the basis of relative merits and utility.
Only the best, as rationally determined by buyers, are selected according to attributes of quality,
costs, functionalities and so on. Closed systems are also selected by businesses on the basis of merit.
By contrast, with open systemic products, especially in information technology, selection is
a highly social process often leading to hypergrowth, hyperselection and decay. Buyers lack infor-
mation, are unaware of complementors, and are uncertain about the technology: they thus risk
committing too early. As a consequence, buyers tend to rely on the choices of others. Choices
may converge in one direction thus triggering extremely rapid growth, or growth may fail to ma-
Games of innovation
The work presented here originated in a keen awareness of the need more effectively to capture em-
pirically the varied ways in which innovative firms collectively shape, and are shaped by, their com-
petitive and collaborative contexts and rules of engagement. Instead of a single science-based
pattern, multiple logics are at work. Constructs such as ‘strategic groups’ and ‘industry best prac-
ARTICLE IN PRESStices’ have proved to be too static, too descriptive and too self-referential to be truly useful. We
propose a typology of games to provide a synthesis.
A definition of games of innovation
Before defining games of innovation, let us stress that they are not game-theory constructs. Formal
game theory is a set of analytical tools for understanding interactions between a limited number of
players and options.9 Games, as we view them, are patterns of innovating that involve many inter-
dependent players, persist over time and are strategically complex. Obviously, games of innovation
are not comparable to sports plays with set players and exogenous sets of clear rules.
‘Games’ are patterns of innovating that involve many interdependent
players, persist over time and are strategically complex
4 Innovation GamesWith these new realities, theories have difficulties coping with the variety of innovation forms.
Multiple paradoxes come to the fore. For instance, the more a technology such as the Internet is
used, copied and licensed, the higher the value can be. Instead of orderly meritocratic selection,
choices may lead to hypergrowth or decay, rejection of superior solutions, and lock-in on inferior
solutions.8 These counterintuitive dynamics compel us to extend our understanding of innovation
beyond the science-based model.terialise for lack of commitment.7
From capture through IP to strategy and muscle
The capture of value in the conventional model relies on strong intellectual property protection,
especially patents that confer a temporary monopoly. However, in most competitive contests, pat-
ents are often entry tickets to cross-licensing rounds. Value capture tends to be achieved not
through intellectual property protection but on the basis of competitive advantages arising from
economies of scale, reputation and marketing muscle. In information industries, cumulative effects
and control of the architecture can trigger winner-take-all rewards.
Value capture tends to be achieved not through intellectual property
protection but on the basis of competitive advantagesPlease cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
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We advocate a holistic and open-ended understanding of industrial innovation. We define games
of innovation as a multi-level construct. Games are:
) Coherent sets of strategies and rules that managers develop to make decisions about innovation
in the different contexts in which they compete. As strategies and rules, games of innovation are
neither universal best practices nor generic industry recipes, but cognitive frameworks that
emerge as managers learn to compete in their specific contexts. The different logics of innovation
generally transcend the preferences and actions of any single player, no matter how prominent.
) Ecosystems of firms that compete and collaborate, thus triggering positive dynamics of growth or
negative evolution toward decay. As emergent collective processes, games usually do not follow
established blueprints determined by contextual conditions, but are flows of strategic moves, en-
trepreneurial initiatives and interactions among interdependent players. Paraphrasing Winston
Churchill, one could say that firms collectively fashion their innovation games and, thereafter,
are fashioned by them. Games may evolve toward healthy performance, just as they may fall
into collective traps of passivity or hyper-competition.10
A typology of games
Despite their open-endedness, games are bound by some basic economic and technical forces and
tend to follow a small number of trajectories.13 In 1984, Keith Pavitt identified four trajectories of
innovation: supplier-dominated, scale-intensive, specialised suppliers, and science-based.14 Others,
such as Michael Best,15 Michael Storper and Robert Salais16 have proposed the concept of worlds.
We extend Pavitt’s seminal work by incorporating the new realities of innovation.
ARTICLE IN PRESSThe a priori typology that best represents the new realities of innovation is illustrated in Figure 1.
Two contextual dimensions are used to build a typology:
i. Value creation. The horizontal axis extends the concept of product architecture to three distinct
categories of exchanges between buyers and producers: simple stand-alone products, easily
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Figure 1. A typology of games of innovation
Long Range Planning, vol -- 2008 5) Sets of public or private institutional arrangements necessary to sustain the different patterns of
innovation. Firms rarely innovate alone. Universities, science-and-technology communities and
entrepreneurial start-ups provide pertinent knowledge. Financial resources and strategic advice
come from venture-capital and innovation-support agencies.11 Customers often provide firms
with the problems to solve, as well as aspects of the solutions.12
Firms rarely innovate alone: universities, science-and-technology
communities and entrepreneurial start-ups provide pertinent
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marketable to all kinds of buyers; closed integrated systems, designed with and for expert buyers;
and open modular systems, in which a platform leader coordinates the complementary offers of
independent component suppliers into evolving products and services.
ii. Market evolution. Two stages are analysed in the vertical axis: first, a market-creation period,
during which entrepreneurs bring new technologies and markets together; second, a market-
maintenance period of growth, persistence and rejuvenation, during which large and small firms
compete for market shares.
The six predicted games (see Figure 1) are patent-driven discovery, systems integration and plat-
form orchestration for market creation, and cost-based search for efficiency, strategic consulting
and systems engineering, and personalised mass production for market maintenance. Table 1
describes the key elements of the six games: logic of value creation (e.g. strategies and rules), value
capture (e.g. mechanisms for appropriation of profits) and ecosystems (competitors and
complementors).
The hypothesis to be tested was whether or not large numbers of firms actually behave in ways
that reveal the presence of six distinct games of innovation. Furthermore, we wanted to discover
whether these games differ statistically from one another. In order to test this hypothesis, we
used the data gathered in the MINE (Managing Innovation in the New Economy) research program
at Ecole Polytechnique in Montreal, Canada. The methodology for identifying the games is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
A taxonomy of games and their dynamics
A taxonomy is an empirically grounded classification. Seven distinct games were identified as sta-
tistically different at the p¼ 0.01 level. The first six games corresponded to the predicted ones. The
Table 1. The dynamics of value creation and capture in each game
Logic of value
creation
Value capture Ecosystem Representative
sectors
Patent-driven  Relentless R&D  IP  Symbiotic firms  Pharmaceuticals
ARTICLE IN PRESSdiscovery  Capabilities  Portfolio of
products
 Public research  Medical devices
 Fuel cells
Systems integration  Integrated
solutions
 Lead users
 Superior systems
 Reputation
 Users
 Contractors
 Alliances
 F1 cars
 Nuclear plants
 PLM systems
Platform
orchestration
 Open platform
 Distributed
innovation
 Platform
hyper-selection
 Merit for
periphery
 Coalitions with
component
providers
 Internet
 Mass software
 Info-mediation
Cost-based search
for efficiency
 Process
streamlining
 Cost cutting
 Economies of
scale
 Entry barriers
 Contractors and
suppliers
 Mining
 PSTN phone
 Chemicals
 Generics
Strategic consulting
and system
engineering
 IT & capital
projects to
improve
productivity
 Cumulative ex-
perience,
reputation
 Project
management
 Few key players
 Multiple
contractors
 Capital & IT
projects
 PLM, ERP, SCM,
CRM
Customised mass
production
 Unique brand
 Scale economies
 System design
 Critical
components
 Supply chain
 Innovative
subsystems
 Automobile
 Mass electronics
 PC, watches
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seventh game, which we had not predicted, we called ‘support for innovation’. Table 2 presents the
most significant statistical results for each game:
) competitive contexts refer to the most salient factors emerging from the analysis
) innovation efforts focus on investment in R&D and staff time allocated to innovation
) innovation strategies refer to the most salient strategies used and
) performance is measured in terms of the contribution of innovation to profitability and annual
sales growth.
ecosystem is composed of a few large competitors surrounded by symbiotic science-based firms (usu-
ally small). Opportunities, especially in early phases, are opened up by entrepreneurs who scout sci-
entific territories with support from public agencies and corporate sponsors.
Large firms often set up venture-development activities to engage in surveillance of strategic
opportunities, licensing in and out and deal-making. For instance, Johnson & Johnson focuses
ARTICLE IN PRESSthe bulk of its innovation efforts on investments in internal and external ventures: the firm’s growth
model is premised on leveraging externally developed technologies, licensing and acquisition activ-
ities, a portfolio of bets at the early stage, and internal discovery.
Sales have grown at an annual rate of 22 per cent in the recent past. Value capture is generally
made possible by patents, regulatory approvals or uncontested product superiority. However, firms
face major turning points when their key patents come to the end of their valid life. To survive,
firms need to continue to invest heavily in R&D or migrate toward production of less
innovative (and less profitable) products.
To survive, patent-driven discoverers need to continue to invest heavily
in R&D or migrate toward production of less innovative products
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Patent-driven discovery
Patent-driven discovery games are closest to the conventional model of innovation. The character-
istic traits of these games are the importance of frontier knowledge production, the need for supe-
rior expertise and the critical role often played by government certification. About 35 per cent of
profits are attributed to recent innovations: a substantial part of innovation efforts is directed to-
ward radical change.
Demand is exogenous, waiting to be identified by market researchers and filled with fully func-
tional products. For example, buyers of pharmaceutical drugs, orthopedic devices, electric batteries,
anti-virus software, and other products have well-known needs, and the task of market researchers is
to find the attributes that best meet those needs. Market selection is meritocratic: buyers understand
the functionalities of products and select them according to explicit performance/price dimensions.
The dominant rules for successful innovation are first, to recruit the best possible scientists and
entrepreneurs who can participate actively in new discoveries; second, to assemble a balanced port-
folio of internal and partnership research projects in search of superior, patentable, and certifiable
solutions; and third, to conduct relentless innovation in projects.
The average expenditure on R&D is 29 per cent of sales, and 38 per cent of staff time is allocated to
innovative activities. Profitable winners eventually lose their edge, as legal protection disappears. The
Patent-driven discovery games are closest to the conventional model of
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Table 2. Several statistically significant dimensions of games
Competitive Innovation Innovation Performance
ARTICLE IN PRESScontext) efforts strategies
Patent-driven
discovery
 Knowledge
production .38
 Rivalry e.29
 Regulation .40
 29.2% R&D/sales
 38% staff on
innovation
 Innovation
projects
 Regulatory
management
 35% profits from
innovation
 22% sales growth/
year
Systems
integration
 Knowledge .23
 Rivalry .01
 Dynamism .01
 32% R&D/sales
 39% staff on
innovation
 Users
 Contractors
 Alliances
 41% profits from
innovation
 23% sales growth/
year
Platform
orchestration
 Dynamism .37
 Rivalry .21
 Knowledge .19
 24% R&D/sales
 28% staff on
innovation
 Coalitions with
component
providers
 52% profits from
innovation
 27% sales growth/
year
Cost-based search  Dynamism e.30  4.4% R&D/sales  Contractors and  24% profits fromSystems integration
Systems integrators build closed systems such as mainframe computers or flight simulators.17
Increasingly, however, they are developers of information technology solutions. Tightly integrated
products and services such as PLMs (Product Lifecycle Management) or ERPs (Enterprise
Resource Planning) are built from interdependent components coordinated by a closed proprie-
tary architecture. Within these systems, individual components cannot be easily modified or
replaced.
Buyers need to perform complex tasks. They demand high-performance tools such as drug-
design software systems, semiconductor design automation systems and design-engineering
systems. The game of systems integration provides them with the tools. Closed-system tools are
sometimes based on emerging science, but generally they build on well-established engineering
principles.
Markets for integrated tools do not pre-exist but co-evolve, as systems integrators interact with
lead buyers. These buyers continuously raise their ceilings of expectations and call for improving
for efficiency  Regulation .18
 Interdependence
e.20
 7.2% staff on
innovation
suppliers innovation
 13% sales growth/
year
Strategic consulting
and system
engineering
 Interdependence
.23
 Dynamism .29
 8.1% R&D/sales
 12% staff on
innovation
 Few key players
 Multiple
contractors
 36% profits from
innovation
 16% sales growth/
year
Customised mass
production
 Rivalry .40
 Dynamism e.34
 Knowledge e.27
 9.7% R&D/sales
 12% staff on
innovation
 Supply chain
 Innovative
subsystems
 30% profits from
innovation
 18% sales growth/
year
Innovation
support
 19% R&D/sales
 24% staff on
innovation
 38% profits from
innovation
 21% sales growth/
year
Source: MINE Research Program, 2007.
) A positive factor score, for example +.38, means that this dimension is above the mean for the whole sample and is significant
at the p¼ 0.01 level. By contrast, a negative factor score, for example e.29, means that this dimension is below the mean for the
whole sample and is significant at the p¼ 0.01 level.
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functionalities and reliability. Each improved version builds on accumulated experience and leads
to the creation of wider markets.
Selection is highly meritocratic. Toolmakers create value by transforming familiarity with lead
buyers’ problems and accumulated engineering experience into long-term partnerships with buyers.
Customer intimacy is necessary to structuring, understanding and solving problems. For instance,
the collaboration between Toyota Motors and Dassault Syste`mes has led to the development of
tools that substantially reduce Toyota’s design costs and time, while enhancing quality. Toyota re-
ported that the use of PLM systems cut model-development costs by 43 per cent and development
time by 44 per cent.18
Systems integrators invest 32 per cent of sales in R&D, not necessarily for patentable solu-
Platform orchestration games focus on the creation of new markets with open modular products, in
areas such as personal computers, Internet-based businesses or info-mediation services. Open mod-
ARTICLE IN PRESSular products appear when tightly integrated closed systems are broken up. The coordination of
components to perform the intended functions is achieved through open platforms (the core), us-
ing standard interfaces to connect components (the periphery).19 The core exhibits high user-
switching costs and is therefore highly inertial, whereas peripheral elements have low switching
costs and low inertia.
Demand does not pre-exist for new systems, but is the result of the co-evolution between buyers
and the platform strategies of orchestrators. Buyers would like self-contained plug-and-play prod-
ucts but are instead offered prototypes. Early platforms are often baffling, as buyers are ill-informed
and unable to assess performance and survival prospects. Early buyers, as a result, risk owning or-
phan products, while rational buyers wait.
The dominant rules of innovation are based less on scientific prowess than on the strategic
leveraging by orchestrators. Intellectual property is not a critical concern. Participants in this
game spend on average 24 per cent of sales on R&D; 28 per cent of staff time is devoted to inno-
vation. The process of launching a new open platform requires persistence, resources and luck. Here
are the key elements of this process:
The process of launching a new open platform requires persistence,
resources and luck
Long Range Planning, vol -- 2008 9tions, but for architectural integration and higher-performance versions. For instance, every
two or three years, designers of chip-making systems develop new platforms, kits and tools
for the manufacturers of integrated circuits used to build computers, telecommunications
equipment, biomedical devices, automotive electronics and other products; 39 per cent of staff
time is devoted to innovation. Systems integrators do not much rely on their ecosystems for
innovating. They do most of their work in-house, contract with technical specialists and acquire
some components. They also enter into alliances with buyers and consultants to reach new
markets.
Value is captured by building proprietary systems; 41 per cent of profits come from innovation.
Many systems compete and survive. Even marginal market positions are sustainable, if the tools
embody specialised architectural knowledge and reputation. Sales grow briskly, at the rate of 23
per cent per year. Pressures to open closed systems are high. Some large customers insist on in-
ter-operability and demand openness in spite of switching costs. However, opening up the archi-
tecture is not the ideal strategy for systems integrators, as profitability will tend to migrate
toward component suppliers.
Platform orchestrationPlease cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
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) The first generation is a barely functional prototype presented in the hope of attracting the at-
tention, first, of potential buyers, and second, of entrepreneurs capable of furnishing the crucial
but missing complements.
) Regardless of the promise and potential of the core, a platform leader will often have to stimulate
market growth by subsidising early adopters and/or early complementors. Orchestrators will
have to be ready to spend for as long as it takes for the platform to reach the stage of self-sus-
tained growth.
) Orchestrators open the platform by means of generous licences, transparent interfaces or the eco-
Cost-based search for efficiency
ARTICLE IN PRESSProducts have become commodities subjected to substitution. Profits erode as imitators enter the
fray. This game is widespread in capital-intensive sectors producing commodities such as generic
drugs, PSTN phones, metals, industrial gases, aluminum, oil and gas, petrochemicals and electric
power. About 24 per cent of profitability is attributable to recent innovations in processes and prod-
ucts. Incremental improvements, rather than the discovery of scientific knowledge, are emphasised.
Buyers seek the most competitive bids and are not particularly loyal. Market selection is based pri-
marily on price. The dominant rules of innovation are, first, to pursue process efficiency relentlessly;
and second, to develop new applications in order to meet the threat of substitutes. Investments in in-
novation are, on average, 4.4 per cent of sales for R&D: 7.2 per cent of staff time is devoted to innovation.
To maintain markets, some firms, in collaboration with equipment suppliers, develop solutions
to customers’ problems. For example, oxygen originally used for cutting and welding metals has
found new applications in steelmaking, petrochemicals, health systems, semi-conductor foundries
and biotechnology. Sales grew at an annual rate of 13 per cent in the recent past.
Firms in the ecosystems of large competitors tend to be specialised contractual suppliers and con-
sultants. Competitors capture value by streamlining activities, building optimal scale processes and
guarding industrial secrets. Late entrants may gain substantially if they have the marketing clout
and the financial resources to attain optimal scale rapidly.
Late entrants may gain substantially if they have the marketing clout
and the financial resources to attain optimal scale rapidly
10 Innovation Gamessystems of third-party suppliers. During the process of growth, a contentious process of align-
ment of core architectures, peripheral components and standards takes place. Few firms have
the resources to persist through the long and profitless stages of initial platform development.
) Beyond a critical threshold, network effects accelerate growth. Below this threshold, network ef-
fects act as a brake on growth. Product superiority and solid patents do not guarantee success.
Instead, strong network effects result in winner-take-most platform battles in which fast-mover
solutions are likely to leave little room for incompatible products and services.
) Platform orchestration becomes riskier when there is direct competition not only from estab-
lished alternatives, but also from other emergent platforms. Network effects will likely cause
the ensuing inter-platform battle to turn into a high-stakes contest for survival. A frantic race
to stimulate buyers and enlist complementors speeds up the growth of promising platforms.
) Products are made by collections of interdependent firms coordinated by the platform orches-
trator, who develops alliances with complementary producers. The purpose is to trigger positive
feedback loops around their platforms.20 Only one or a few platforms survive the contentious
process, but many component-makers thrive. Managing the ecosystem is central to its success.
Sales grow at the high rate of 27 per cent per year. Innovative products and services account
for 52 per cent of profits.
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Strategic consulting and systems engineering
This game concerns the extension of closed integrated systems to the building of mission-critical
production or IT infrastructures of large operators. Major capital investments are made in sectors
tem is composed of a limited number of strategy consultants, systems engineers and component
suppliers.
Consultants must stay significantly ahead of buyers if they are to contribute innovative solutions.
On average, 8.1 per cent of sales are invested in R&D and capabilities building; 12 per cent of staff
time is allocated to innovation. Consultants interact with customers, complementors, networks of
university professors, gurus, vendors and other players. Knowledge accumulation takes place
ARTICLE IN PRESSthrough the formalisation of methodologies, the codification of past learning experience in archives
or the building of knowledge or expertise systems; 36 of profits come from innovation. Sales have
grown at 16 per cent per year in the recent past.
Strategy consultants capture value by improving their reputation, gaining experience, and thus
securing further assignments. Reputation and experience are the dominant selection criteria. Engi-
neering consultants capture value by building partnerships with operators, top-level consultants
and product suppliers: all of them are involved in improving performance.
Customised mass production
Over the last 25 years, a significant transformation of mass production has taken place, as a result of
innovations that have enhanced process flexibility and made customisation possible. Customised
mass production is basically a battle of brands waged by assemblers catering to heterogeneous mar-
ket needs, within the parameters specified by the dominant architectural platform. The significant
contextual dimensions are high rivalry, interdependencies between value-chain players, but low
market and technical dynamism.
When a battle for architecture is finally settled in favour of a set of coherent and stable choices,
technical and market uncertainties fall and industry-wide learning can become cumulative. Mass
production on a global scale is now possible, as interface standards have become transparent and
stable. This game can be observed in automobiles, mass electronics and durable consumption
goods. How it will be played out in information goods and telecommunications is still unclear.
Similarities include the presence of assemblers, the need for an ecosystem of component makers
and high customisation around brands, while differences include network effects, inertia and hyper-
selection mechanisms.
Strategy consultants capture value by improving their reputation,
gaining experience, and thus securing further assignments
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Operators need to buy such systems to meet customers’ demand, radically transform their cost
structures, and improve delivery of products and services. Projects to build such systems often
put operators at risk because of the financial commitments, cost overruns and performance failures
involved. Sales of such systems grow at a rate of 16 per cent per year.
The dominant rule for innovation is a shared process of collective problem-solving involving
large buyers, specialised consultants and engineering firms. In this collective process, knowledge
emerges from the interactions that generate novel solutions and new knowledge. For instance, firms
building petrochemical facilities do not rely only on their operational knowledge but instead tap
expert engineering suppliers such as Lurgi, TO and IFP, and project management specialists
such as Bechtel and SNC. Similarly, buyers of large IT systems use consultants such as McKinsey,
IBM or CapGemini to tailor hardware, software and work practices to their needs.
The significant contextual dimensions of this game are high market dynamism and strong inter-
dependencies among players. Instead of network effects leading to ‘winner-take-all’ scenarios, the
interactions result in a deepening of knowledge that triggers very meritocratic choices. The ecosys-Please cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
Planning (2008), doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2008.02.006
Customers want low-cost but differentiated products: the main trade-offs are style, price, perfor-
mance and brand. Commoditisation is avoided, or at least postponed, through market segmenta-
tion and product differentiation. By catering to different market segments, not only are competitors
products. Usually, industries where this game prevails are characterised by high barriers to entry,
the need for tight coordination, and high levels of stability. The automobile sector, for example,
has been in the customised mass production game for over 70 years, albeit with continuous perfor-
mance improvements. Component-makers can capture value by reducing the costs and enhancing
the performance of their subsystems. Suppliers of critical non-standardised components (such as
Intel, which makes computer chips) can, however, capture substantial benefits for themselves.
ARTICLE IN PRESSSupporting innovation
A seventh game emerged from the cluster analysis. Innovating requires information, methodologies
and strategic advice that are better produced by highly specialised organisations. A substantial
group of public and private organisations, including Battelle, Forrester Research and the
Frauenhofer Institute, provide various services to innovators. Many contract R&D organisations
are repositories of specialised industrial knowledge that innovators do not own. Finally, govern-
ment agencies and consultants provide advice about technologies, markets, partners and knowl-
edgeable individuals, and facilitate access to publicly funded programs.
The dominant rule of innovation is the development of specialised technologies and methodol-
ogies for solving problems. Firms in this game spend 19 per cent of sales on R&D, and 24 per cent
of staff time is allocated to innovation activities. Sales grow on average 21 per cent per year, and 38
per cent of profitability is attributable to innovations. Value capture is difficult in this game. Con-
tract research and consulting are very competitive, low-margin activities.
Different games may coexist. Around 53 per cent of respondents play in a single game; other
firms are diversified and play in two or more games. Just as a single game may cut across several
sectors and industries, a single industry may contain multiple games. Many firms in the IT sector,
for example, are involved not only as strategy or engineering consultants but also as mass software
designers; some even build hardware.
Persistence of games and migrations across sectors, industries and firms
The emphasis on disruptions by Schumpeter and his followers assumes the inevitability of lifecycle
evolution, from market creation to maturity and decline. Our perspective is different. Games persist
over time and reproduce themselves. As long as contextual forces remain basically unchanged, the
games persist. Knowledge and specific assets progress, but the rules remain basically the same. With
the division of labour in innovation new games may appear.
Persistence does not mean inertia, however. Decisions and actions reproduce the same patterns
of innovation. Yet rules and practices are incrementally improved by taking account of the oppor-
tunities opened up by technical change, successful strategies and learning. However, sectors,
Just as a single game may cut across several sectors and industries,
a single industry may contain multiple games
12 Innovation Gamesstaying away from each other but they may increase the size of one another’s revenue pies.
The rules for innovating are basically to create and capture value by combining the unique de-
sign, styling and branding of assemblers with the process innovations of global component makers.
Investment in R&D totals 9.7 per cent of sales, with 12 per cent of staff time allocated to innovation.
Brand management and product design are at the core of the business model. Assemblers thus per-
form R&D activities mostly in-house, as design is so strategic for branding. Innovations in systems
and components can be shared with specialists.
Innovation accounts for 30 per cent of profitability and sales grow at the rate of 18 per cent per
year. Value capture by assemblers is the result of unique designs and branding in the marketing ofPlease cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
Planning (2008), doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2008.02.006
industries and firms eventually abandon or change games as competitive conditions shift and no
longer fit with specific assets, levels of investment and/or established rules. Migrations thus take
place when players decide to change, or are unable to maintain, established rules of action.
Turning points may be triggered by endogenous events, (e.g., the emergence of a dominant de-
sign, the commoditisation of products, the opening of closed systems) or by exogenous events (a
disruptive breakthrough, invasion by dominant players or a drastic change in government regula-
tion). For instance, judicial and regulatory decisions in the telecommunications sector have fostered
the entry of new competitors and unleashed a slew of technical advances. Today, new technical
Internet-based options have displaced the old wired PSTN networks, and services such as YouTube,
MySpace and Skype, which extend far beyond simple telephone conversations, are proposed to
customers. Figure 2 describes the major migration trajectories between games. These migrations
normally follow the four natural trajectories described below.
From discovery to commoditisation and back
Arrow A in Figure 2 indicates the migrations that take place when the key underlying patents come
to the end of their valid life and products become commodities. A reverse migration occurs when
players make discoveries that open up new opportunities and fields (see Arrow B). When this hap-
pens, the game returns to the relentless search. This dynamic fits the classic account of entrepre-
Sectors, industries, and firms eventually abandon or change games as
competitive conditions shift and no longer fit with established rules
efficiency engineering 
Innovation support:
business and technical
production
Figure 2. Migration paths
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From systems integration to system extension and back
Highly specialised integrated systems, designed initially for leading customers, can be offered in
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this transition, while Arrow D refers to the reverse and rarer migration in which firms involved in
broad deployment and extension of integrated systems develop best-of-breed applications.
From orchestration to customisation and back
Once platform choices are crystallised around one or a few dominant designs, basic functionalities
are more than adequate. Buyers start demanding lower costs and variety. The migration toward cus-
tomisation is described by arrow E. Arrow F refers to the backward migrations that happen when
technical discontinuities help competitors develop new open approaches.
Academics should develop an understanding of innovation and business strategy that recognises
the systemic nature of products. Platforms are not products, modules are not systems, value nets are
not value chains, and the decision to open a platform is not a mere engineering choice. Our approach
suggests staying away from reductionist accounts of industrial evolution. ‘Design rules’ do not
always emerge in R&D laboratories: often, they emerge as a result of negotiations, competitive battles
logic and tempo of game evolution. There are times to go with the flow, but there are also times to
ARTICLE IN PRESSbet massively on a sectoral change of course. The actors most capable of quickly reading the emerg-
ing new plays will be those best positioned to exploit the early indeterminacy to their own
advantage.
Business executives also need to develop a view of firms’ success or failure that takes into con-
sideration the collaboration of competitors and complementors. A sustainable innovation game is
one in which all the major players involved can thrive. Healthy game dynamics are a collective ne-
cessity no less than a collective achievement. The first order of business for all players should be to
turn potential negative-sum games into positive-sum games by stressing collaboration.
A sustainable innovation game is one in which all the major players
involved can thrive
14 Innovation Gamesand conflictive exchanges between buyers, producers, consultants and other relevant players.
Managers, like academics, should view innovation as a task divided among many industries and
sectors. They should worry far less about imitating industry best practices and more about correctly
gauging the strategic issues that define their game(s). Managers need an architectural understanding
of business strategy, competitive contexts and products. We advise them to develop a feel for the
‘Design rules’ do not always emerge in R&D laboratories: often, they
emerge as a result of negotiations and conflictive exchangesFrom closed to open systems and back
Early in their lifecycle, platforms are best kept closed, tightly integrated and centralised.21 Only
later, as uncertainty about optimal product configurations decreases, will it be preferable to open
up and decentralise the platform.22 This path is illustrated by arrow G.
Eventually, as radically new technologies loom on the horizon, innovators will revert to a closed
platform and a centralised governance regime, in order to develop new functional and reliable sys-
tems (see arrow H).
Conclusions
Our approach urges academics and business executives to reassess the validity of conventional ap-
proaches, no matter how well established. The taxonomy we propose here is based not on a priori
concepts but on extensive empirical measurements of the phenomena of innovation.Please cite this article in press as: R. Miller et al., Innovation Games: A New Approach to the Competitive Challenge, Long Range
Planning (2008), doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2008.02.006
Appendix A
Methodology for the empirical identification of games
ARTICLE IN PRESSTo identify the games empirically, we used a broad sampling approach and field research conducted
by the MINE (Managing Innovation in the New Economy) research program at Ecole Polytechni-
que in Montreal, Canada.
A grounded approach. Instead of limiting ourselves to the existing literature on innovation, we
started with structured interviews with 75 CTOs and VPs of R&D in many industries and regions of
the world. Sectors such as biotechnology, telecommunications, software, aerospace, aluminum,
pulp and paper, engineering and construction, and multimedia were covered. Firms included
Sun Microsystems, Synopsys, Air Products and Chemicals, Cambridge Technology Partners, Novar-
tis, Armstrong etc. The issues discussed were: activities undertaken to create and capture value for
customers through innovation; the pertinent strategies and practices; and the competitive contexts.
After this initial round, a survey tool was developed.
Building the MINE survey tool. Combining observations from interviews and constructs from
the literature on innovation, a measurement instrument was then designed. The survey tool is avail-
able at www.minesurvey.polymtl.ca. The following sets of variables were incorporated.
) Contextual variables focused on the buyers’ expertise, product architecture, interdependencies
between players, pace of scientific and knowledge production, economic and regulatory factors,
competitive dynamics and pace of change and relative importance of products versus services
sold.
) Level of innovation efforts: R&D over sales, proportion of staff time devoted to innovation, efforts
to build strategic, marketing, technical and organisational capabilities, types of innovation
sought, and direction of investments in innovation.
) Value-creation activities: cost reduction, engineering of products with reliability and safety, pro-
motion of platforms solutions, gaining regulatory approvals, positioning as de facto standards,
and so on.
) Strategies for innovation: sources of competitive advantages now and in the near future, compet-
itive moves and collaborative moves. Strategic initiatives to renew competitive advantage and re-
spond to changes.
) Organisational design for innovation: extent to which staff understand links between innovation
and strategy, presence of management processes, rules that guide innovative action. Enabling
roles played by partners in networks.
) Practices for managing innovation: exploration for opportunities, portfolio and pipeline manage-
ment, project management and commercialisation practices.
) Performance: subjective (innovativeness relative to competitors, impact of efforts, contribution of
innovative products and services to profitability) objective (sales growth, profitability and ROI
over last three years).
Pre-testing of tool. A preliminary version of the tool was pre-tested with 100 firms. Items that
did not exhibit significant variation or that were difficult to understand were reformulated and
sometimes eliminated.
Identification of target sample. Using the North American Industrial Classification scheme, 20
sectors were identified. Lists of firms from around the world were built by consulting data banks,
associations and stock exchanges. Efforts were made to cover all sectors, regions and sizes of firm. A
team of 10 engineering students at Ecole Polytechnique was formed to solicit respondents directly
on the Web, though face-to-face meetings or by fax.
Data gathering: The plan was to target 5,000 senior managers and obtain 1,000 respondents.
Substantial efforts and various tactics had to be deployed. We were successful in getting responses
from 1,000 single business firms, large SBUs and smaller firms. Our sample is geographically dis-
tributed as follows: Asia (250), Europe (200), North America (471), South America (52), other (27).
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Data analysis to identify clusters. The data were reduced and analysed in the following fashion:
i Data reduction was achieved through multiple principal components analysis to reduce the 335
(2001).
16. M. Storper and R. Salais, Worlds of Production, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1997).
ARTICLE IN PRESS17. A. Prencipe, A. Davies and M. Hobday, The Business of Systems Integration, Oxford University Press,
Oxford (2003).
18. The Auto Channel, Toyota, IBM and Dassault establish global cooperation. Available from: http://www.
theautochannel.com/ (March 2002).
19. M. A. Schilling, Toward a general modular systems theory and its application in interfirm product mod-
ularity, Academy of Management Review 25(2), 312e334 (2000).
20. M. A. Cusumano and A. Gawer, Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco drive industry inno-
vation, Harvard Business School Press, Boston (2002).
21. C. Christensen and M. E. Raynor, Why hard-nosed executives should care about management theory,
Harvard Business Review 81(9), (2003).
22. H. W. Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology,
Harvard Business School Press, Boston (2003).
16 Innovation Games14. K. Pavitt, Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and a theory, Research Policy 13,
343e373 (1984).
15. M. Best, The new competition: institutions of industrial restructuring, Harvard University Press, Cambridgeitems of the MINE Survey Tool to 29 principal components.
ii Multiple cluster analyses were performed using the Ward method: this method attempts to min-
imise the sum of squares within clusters and maximise the Euclidean distances between clusters.
Many cluster analyses were done using value-creation and value-capture activities as well as a few
decision variables.
A stable solution was achieved with seven clusters. We observed that solutions involving more
than seven groups tended to be unstable, while solutions with under five clusters tended to form
very large and difficult-to-interpret groups. We concluded that seven statistically different clusters
was the most viable solution. ANOVA and T-tests were used to establish that clusters were indeed
significantly different from each other at the p¼ 0.01 level.
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